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The Value of Democracy: 
Evidence from Road Building in Kenya†
By Robin Burgess, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, 
Ameet Morjaria, and Gerard Padró i Miquel*
Ethnic favoritism is seen as antithetical to development. This paper 
provides credible quantification of the extent of ethnic favorit-
ism using data on road building in Kenyan districts across the 
1963–2011 period. Guided by a model, it then examines whether the 
transition in and out of democracy under the same president constrains 
or exacerbates ethnic favoritism. Across the  post-independence 
period, we find strong evidence of ethnic favoritism: districts that 
share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure 
on roads and have five times the length of paved roads built. This 
favoritism disappears during periods of democracy. (JEL D72, H54, 
J15, O15, O17, O22, R42)
Ethnic favoritism refers to a situation where coethnics benefit from patronage 
and public policy decisions, and thus receive a disproportionate share of public 
resources, when members of their ethnic group control the government. It has been 
argued by historians, political scientists, and economists that this phenomenon 
has hampered the economic performance of many countries, particularly in Africa 
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(Mamdani 1996; Easterly and Levine 1997; Herbst 2000; Posner 2005; Alesina 
and La Ferrara 2005; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 
2011; Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou 2012). In fact, the widespread 
belief among citizens that ethnic favoritism is prevalent can “poison” local political 
culture and make the phenomenon self-sustaining (Horowitz 1985; Esman 1994; 
Fearon 1999; Wamwere 2003; Chandra 2004; Padró i Miquel 2007; Caselli and 
Coleman 2013). According to several of these accounts, ethnic favoritism emerges 
when weak political institutions are unable to constrain governments from discrim-
inating among citizens. Therefore, to understand the recent political and economic 
performance of many African countries, it is crucially important to determine to 
what extent ethnic favoritism is prevalent, and whether the emergence (or in many 
cases, re-emergence) of democracy has helped mitigate it.
In this paper we make two contributions. First, we quantify the extent of 
ethnic favoritism in public resource allocation in an African country for the 
 post-independence period. Second, we examine whether the transition into and out 
of democracy affects the extent of ethnic favoritism.
These issues have been difficult to address so far due to a number of factors. To 
begin with, it is challenging to determine which ethnic group is getting what share 
of public expenditure. This problem is particularly acute in Africa where govern-
ment statistical agencies have been underfunded for decades, where data on the 
allocation of government spending is typically patchy at best and where, even when 
the data does exist, there is a reluctance to release disaggregated data that could 
allow the populace to uncover evidence of ethnic favoritism. Moreover, estimation 
of ethnic bias requires observing what happens with public expenditure when there 
are switches of the ethnic group in power. In many African countries this is difficult 
given the long tenures of post-independence leaders and the fact that particular eth-
nic groups have tended to be dominant for extended periods. Finally, to estimate the 
impact of institutional changes such as democratization on ethnic favoritism, one 
needs to observe switches between democracy and autocracy under the same leader, 
which is far from common.
To address these difficulties we pick an appropriate context: road building across 
Kenyan districts. This setting is attractive for a number of reasons. First, there is dra-
matic ethnic segregation across districts in Kenya, which is the result of the design 
of colonial-era borders in the period before Kenya’s independence in 1963. Each 
post-independence district was dominated by a single ethnic group, and this pattern 
remains stable over time. Therefore we can directly assess, using road spending and 
construction by district, whether or not ethnic groups that shared the ethnicity of the 
president disproportionately benefited from roads.
Second, road expenditure can be directly measured. We have carried out exten-
sive historical archival work to recover road expenditure data at the project level. 
This has enabled us to construct district-level panel data on road expenditure for all 
41 Kenyan districts across the entire post-independence period. In addition, we have 
constructed a panel of road presence in each of the 41 Kenyan districts using his-
torical maps. We can therefore cross-check the district road expenditure data (from 
the road projects) with the district road construction data (from the maps). Having 
this level of detailed data on two independent measures of the same public good is 
extremely rare in low-income countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Third, roads are the largest single element of public expenditure in Kenya, con-
stituting about 15 percent of total development expenditure over our sample period. 
This is three times what the Kenyan central government spends on health, educa-
tion, or water. Roads expenditure is centrally allocated and a highly visible form of 
public investment and thus a prime area for political patronage. Road building thus 
represents an attractive setting in which to analyze the extent of ethnic favoritism.
Fourth, the post-independence history of Kenya provides us both with switches 
in the ethnicity of the president, and switches into and out of democracy under the 
same president (see Figure 1). During our study period, we observe (i) a transition 
into autocracy from democracy under the first president of Kenya (Jomo Kenyatta, 
an ethnic Kikuyu), (ii) a transition from a Kikuyu president to a Kalenjin president 
(Daniel arap Moi) under an autocratic regime, (iii) a transition out of autocracy into 
democracy under Moi, and (iv) a democratic succession of a Kalenjin president to 
a Kikuyu president (Mwai Kibaki). These shifts allow us to identify the effect of 
political transitions on ethnic favoritism holding the identity of the leader constant.
Fifth, as is apparent in Figure 2, democratic change in Kenya mirrors the pattern 
seen across sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya, like many African countries, was reason-
ably democratic post-independence in the 1960s, became autocratic in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and then returned to democracy in the 1990s and 2000s.1 Our results for 
Kenya might thus provide insights into broader patterns of African economic and 
political development. For example, if we find that democracy has value in terms of 
imposing constraints on the executive (which in turn limits ethnic favoritism), then 
this might help explain why economic growth has been higher in democratic (1960s, 
1990s, 2000s) relative to autocratic (1970s, 1980s) periods. We return to this issue 
in the conclusion.
1 Polity is on a −10 to +10 scale, with scores below −5 classified as autocratic. To capture transitions between 
autocracy and imperfect democracy which have characterized Africa’s post-independence history, we classify 
scores of −5 and above as democracies. This involves combining anocracies (i.e., imperfect democracies) and full 
democracies (which have scores 5 and above) together so that a country is either autocratic (below −5) or demo-
cratic (−5 or more) at a given point in time. We use this lower cutoff as the majority of the transitions in Africa (and 
indeed throughout the developing world) have been from autocracy to imperfect democracy (rather than autocracy 
to full democracy) and we want to exploit this variation to examine whether it affects ethnic favoritism. 
Figure 1. Political and Leadership Transitions, 1963–2011
Notes: This timeline illustrates the history of political transitions and leadership transitions in 
Kenya. Political transitions are as follows: December 1969 is the transition from democracy 
to autocracy, while December 1992 is the return of democracy. Leadership transitions: from 
Kenyatta (Kikuyu) to Moi (Kalenjin) in August 1978, and from Moi (Kalenjin) to Kibaki 
(Kikuyu) in December 2002.
KENYATTA
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Democracy
KENYATTA
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Our unique setup therefore allows us to assess whether there is ethnic favorit-
ism in roads investment, to quantify the magnitude of this effect, and to estimate 
the extent to which favoritism is affected by democratization. To help us inter-
pret our results, we set up a model of centralized presidential public resource 
allocation across districts. The model shows how the degree of ethnic favoritism 
is determined by the constraints on executive action that characterize different 
political regimes.
We find striking patterns. Across the 1963–2011 period, Kenyan districts that 
share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure on roads and 
almost five times the length of paved roads built relative to what would be predicted 
by their population share. This is evidence of an extreme degree of ethnic favorit-
ism. However, these biases are not constant. While in periods of autocracy, coethnic 
districts receive three times the average expenditure in roads and over five times 
the length of paved roads, both these biases disappear during periods of democracy. 
Thus, the political regime is an important determinant of ethnic favoritism. The 
fact that we find similar results using two independent road datasets—one based on 
expenditure and the other on road maps—is reassuring.
We construct a counterfactual road network based on the goal of maximizing mar-
ket potential. There is no evidence of ethnic favoritism in this simulated data, nor is 
ethnic favoritism affected by the political regime. This indicates that (i) our strong 
ethnic favoritism results in the actual data series are not being driven by coethnic 
districts just happening to have high market potential, and (ii) our democracy results 
are not due to some coincidence between regime transitions and a natural expansion 
of the road network over time. We also show that if we drop high  economic potential 
−10
−5
0
5
10
C
om
bi
ne
d 
po
lit
y 
sc
or
e
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya
Figure 2. Evolution of Political Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1963–2011
Notes: This figure plots the revised combined polity score for Kenya and the population 
weighted average for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Polity IV defines regimes in three catego-
ries: autocracies (−10 to −6), anocracies (−5 to +5), and democracies (+6 to +10). Vertical 
lines indicate regime changes in Kenya: December 1969 is the transition from democracy to 
autocracy, while December 1992 is the return of democracy. Data sources and construction are 
described in online Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
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districts (e.g., those in the former White Highlands, around Nairobi, or on major 
commercial corridors) then our results still hold.
A key insight from our theoretical model is that the ethnic bias parameters that 
we estimate can be interpreted in terms of regime-specific constraints on executive 
action. In this light, our empirical findings suggest that even “imperfect” democratic 
institutions, like those found in Kenya during the 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s, have 
value by imposing constraints on the executive. Indeed, we show that movements in 
the regime-specific executive constraint parameter derived from our model (and esti-
mated using our data) closely parallel those in the polity measure of democracy in 
Figure 2. In the context of the many African countries where presidential power has 
an ethnic base, democracy thus may translate to lessened favoritism toward coeth-
nics as political leaders are forced to share public goods across the wider population.
Closer examination of recent Kenyan history sheds light on how the re-emer-
gence of democracy in the 1990s changed the nature of constraints on Kenyan lead-
ers and altered the allocation of public resources. Democracy heralded an increase 
in political choice and participation as well as less repression of popular expression, 
including by increasingly vocal civil society groups. There was a reduction in press 
censorship, an explosion of private print and electronic media, and a more active 
role of parliament and the judiciary in holding political leaders to account (Wrong 
2009). These changes meant that the actions of political leaders were under much 
greater scrutiny, which helps to understand why ethnic favoritism was dramatically 
reduced during periods of democracy.
Despite its perceived centrality to economic development in Africa, the study 
of ethnic favoritism in public good allocation using subnational data is a relatively 
recent phenomena in large part due to the absence of subnational (e.g., district) 
panel datasets covering the period from independence to the present. Demographic 
and Health Surveys for Kenya (Kramon and Posner 2014) and from across Africa 
(Frank and Rainer 2012), which allow researchers to construct schooling and health 
outcomes over long periods, are generating new insights into whether or not political 
leaders favor coethnics. Innovative use of satellite data has also enabled researchers 
to track regional outcomes across leadership and regime transitions (Hodler and 
Raschky 2014; Morjaria 2014). The literature is thus moving beyond the seminal 
cross-country analysis of Easterly and Levine (1997). We will turn to a discussion 
of how our paper complements and contributes to this fast growing literature in the 
conclusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a theo-
retical framework. Section II presents the historical background on roads and pol-
itics in Kenya and describes the data. Section III presents the methods and results. 
Section IV interprets these findings in light of our model and recent Kenyan history. 
Section V links our paper to the literature on ethnic favoritism, public goods, and 
economic development in Africa, and concludes.
I. Theoretical Framework
Consider a repeated economy populated by infinitely lived agents that discount 
the future at rate  δ . There is a set of citizens of size  1 . Citizens belong to one of two 
ethnic groups,  i ∈ {A, B} , and the population share of group  A is  π A . In addition to 
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the citizens, each group also has an elite that comprises an infinitely countable set of 
identical potential presidents.
At any point in time, there is a president in power who belongs to either one of 
these groups,  j ∈ {A, B} . The president decides on lump-sum taxes  τ , common for 
both groups, and on the amount of public benefits such as schooling, health, civil 
service jobs, or roads that he provides to each group.2 Denote by  η i j the per cap-
ita public benefits expenditure that group  i receives when the president belongs to 
group  j . The president only cares about rent extraction, which each period is simply 
given by
  π A (τ −  η A j ) +  π B (τ −  η B j ) . 
The citizens of group  i pay taxes  τ and enjoy public benefits  η i j , which gives them 
the following simple instantaneous utility:
  R ( η i j ) − τ, 
where  R( · ) is increasing and concave. Note that citizens here do not have any inher-
ent preference for the ethnicity of the president, and only care about the public ben-
efit policies that the president implements.
The president can discriminate across groups in public spending but is limited by 
institutional and societal constraints. Following Besley and Persson (2010, 2011) 
we capture these constraints on the executive in a simple way as follows:
(1)  η i j ≤ θ ( π A η A j +  π B  η B j )  ,
where  θ ∈ [1, ∞] denotes the weakness of constraints on the executive. This for-
mulation states that per capita spending in favor of group  i cannot exceed average 
per capita spending by more than a factor  θ . If  θ = ∞ , institutions are so weak that 
they do not constrain the president in any way and all spending can be targeted to 
one group. At the opposite extreme,  θ = 1 implies that no discrimination across 
groups is possible.
We assume that political institutions are also relatively weak, and therefore the 
active support of one’s coethnics is necessary to stay in power.3 As in Padró i Miquel 
(2007), we assume that an acting president who receives the support of his ethnic 
group stays in power with probability  
_ γ. If instead coethnics refuse to support the 
policies of the president, such policies cannot be implemented and he is ousted from 
2 We assume no tax discrimination for a number of reasons. First, the empirical evidence is mixed on African 
governments’ capacity to effectively discriminate with taxation (Bates 1981; Kasara 2007), so this simplifying 
assumption is a useful benchmark. Moreover,  τ here includes legal taxes and also indirect ways of extracting rents. 
The assumption of no tax discrimination is therefore equivalent to assuming that the cost of rent-seeking falls 
equally on all citizens. Nothing crucial hinges on this assumption, since Padró i Miquel (2007) obtains similar 
results in a model with tax discrimination. 
3 To capture a wide variety of political institutions, we do not take a strong stance on what this support means 
in practice. It can range from ethnic voting for the appropriate candidate to exerting violence in order to deny other 
ethnic groups the full exercise of their democratic rights. 
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power. In this case, an open succession follows, and the new president belongs to the 
same ethnic group as the ousted president with probability  γ _ , for  1 >  _ γ ≥  γ _ > 0 .4
This simple model features a unique Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) char-
acterized in the following proposition, which is proven in online Appendix C (the 
mathematical Appendix).
PROPOSITION 1: Assume  θ < max  { 1 __  π A ,  1 __  π B } . There is a unique MPE in which
 (i )  R ′ ( η ii ) =  R ′ ( η j j ) =  1 _θ , 
 (ii ) (1) is binding for presidents of both groups,
 (iii ) Coethnics are indifferent between supporting and rejecting the president.
In this model, the optimal level of public benefits spending is such that 
 R ′ (η) = 1 for both groups.5 In contrast, point (i) of the Proposition says that 
presidents oversupply their group with public benefits and point (ii) says that they 
only provide the other group as much as they are required by the constraints on 
the executive. Therefore in this model there definitely is ethnic bias in public good 
allocation. However, this does not mean that coethnics are much better off, since 
point (iii) notes that the president pushes his own coethnics down to their reser-
vation level.
To build intuition for this result, first note that the president needs the support 
of his group at the same time that he wants to raise  τ as high as possible in order 
to maximize rent extraction. But for coethnic support he only needs to ensure that 
his group is indifferent between being under his rule or being ruled by a president 
from the other group. Therefore in equilibrium he can impose high taxes on every-
one and partly compensate his coethnics with public benefits. This keeps his sup-
porters indifferent since the fact that he is expropriating from them is compensated 
by the fear that a president from the other group would steal even more, which is 
true in equilibrium. Meanwhile the other group is stuck with high taxes and little 
public expenditure. As a result, coethnics fare better than the other group, but both 
groups fare much worse than under an efficient government that supplies the optimal 
amount of benefits and does not appropriate rents.
This rent extraction strategy hinges on the ability to discriminate. As constraints 
on the executive become tighter, the president is forced to provide more benefits to 
the other group. The more benefits he is forced to provide to the other group (i.e., 
the smaller  θ is), the less he can appropriate and hence the weaker the incentives to 
4 In this simple formulation, the weakness of transition rules can be captured by  
_ γ −  γ _ . A large difference 
captures a system where the personality of the ruler is very important, as would be the case if the ruling clique 
can easily manipulate the political contest. If this difference is zero, there is no personality-dependent incumbency 
advantage. For simplicity and to save on notation, we assume that both ethnic groups are symmetric in political 
terms. This might, of course, not be true in reality and both  
_ γ and  γ _ could differ across groups, capturing differences 
in their populations, internal structure, or security of their hold on power. Allowing for this will not change any of 
the results of interest (see Padró i Miquel 2007). 
5 This is because lump-sum taxes ensure that the marginal cost of public funds is  1 . 
1824 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW juNE 2015
manipulate public good provision to his advantage. For this reason, ethnic bias is 
increasing in  θ .
This simple framework shows that ethnic favoritism can arise when institutions 
are weak, even when leaders do not value the welfare of coethnics above that of 
non-coethnics. It also implies that constraints on the executive are binding, which 
helps interpret empirical estimates. This is a general illustrative framework and 
is therefore not specific to any particular public good or country. The reality of 
Kenyan politics is, of course, more complicated than the model. For instance, while 
only two ethnic groups have had presidents in post-independence Kenya (Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin), they and several other ethnic groups were engaged in complicated 
 coalition dynamics throughout the period that we analyze. However, we show in the 
results section that the bias in road construction is only tied to coethnicity with the 
president (and to a lesser extent the vice president), and not to coethnicity with other 
cabinet ministers, suggesting the focus on executive power is appropriate. Similarly, 
we show that while we observe cabinets including ministers from multiple ethnic 
groups, we do not observe any evidence that cabinets become more ethnically repre-
sentative under democracy. These facts suggest that coalition politics are not likely 
to be the leading driver of ethnic favoritism under democracy or dictatorship. The 
model also abstracts from electoral politics which undoubtedly changed with the 
advent of multiparty democracy. As in the case of cabinet formation, we make this 
simplification because we show that there is no evidence of greater road expenditure 
targeting “swing voter” districts under democracy.
Therefore our simple model with only two groups and democracy working 
through constraints on the executive is useful for guiding our empirical analysis. 
Indeed, in Section IV we explicitly link our empirical findings to the  θ parameter 
in the model and show that our interpretation of the effect of democracy in terms 
of constraints on the executive is consistent with the recent evolution of Kenyan 
political institutions.
II. Background and Data
A. Districts and Ethnicity in Kenya
Kenya’s population comprises a mix of more than 40 ethnic groups. According 
to the population census conducted immediately prior to independence (1962), 
Kenya’s main ethnic groups were the Kikuyu (18.80 percent), Luo (13.40 percent), 
Luhya (12.70 percent), Kalenjin (10.80 percent), and Kamba (10.50 percent). The 
shares of these main ethnic groups have remained stable since then despite the fact 
that the national population has increased nearly five-fold (see panel A of online 
Appendix Table A1).
These ethnic groups predate the British but boundaries between them were often 
not well delineated and centralized political structures based on ethnic lines were 
largely absent (Sheriff 1985). Authority was typically personal and local, often a 
function of lineage, age, and wealth and not of ethnic allegiance (Mamdani 1996; 
Herbst 2000).
This situation changed when the British imposed a provincial administration 
model in the early twentieth century which divided the country into provinces and 
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districts. In drawing district borders, the views of local African chiefs and notables 
were increasingly sought via boundary commissions. As shown in online Appendix 
Figure A1, district boundaries in 1909 bear little relation to ethnic boundaries at 
independence. The alignment of interests between the British and local chiefs—
both of whom preferred greater district ethnic homogeneity as a means of facili-
tating governance—however, meant that by 1933 district borders were drawn in a 
way so that each district typically contained a dominant ethnicity. By independence 
in 1963, district and ethnic boundaries tightly coincide—38 out of 41 districts in 
Kenya had a single ethnic group constituting more than 50 percent of the popula-
tion, and this remains the case up until the present. The only  districts that were not 
dominated by a single ethnic group were Nairobi, Mombasa, and Trans Nzoia.6
In our analysis, we use the 1963 district boundaries. Districts in Kenya, in effect, 
serve as stable ethnic markers thus allowing us to precisely assign expenditures 
or road length to particular ethnic groups. This in turn enables us to establish 
whether districts that share the ethnicity of a given president receive more road 
investment and also to establish whether this bias differs across democratic versus 
autocratic periods.
B. Ethnic Politics in Kenya
African political parties were sanctioned at the Lancaster House Conference in 
1960. In May of that year, the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) was formed 
and led by Jomo Kenyatta (an ethnic Kikuyu). Soon after, driven by the fear of 
Kikuyu and Luo domination, the Kenya Africa Democratic Union (KADU) was 
formed. KADU was composed largely by members of numerically smaller ethnic 
groups, and led by Daniel arap Moi (an ethnic Kalenjin). These parties contested the 
first post-independence election of 1963. KANU won the election convincingly and 
in less than two years, all KADU MPs had joined KANU, resulting in the temporary 
end of opposition representation in Parliament.
In the mid-1960s, however, several members of KANU defected to a new 
left-leaning Luo-led party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU), which opposed the 
perceived growing conservatism and pro-Western orientation of Kenyatta and the 
KANU leadership. The anti-communist logic of the Cold War, however, meant that 
the KPU was banned in 1969, ostensibly on national security grounds. This banning 
institutionalized single-party autocracy and is reflected in a sharp fall in Kenya’s 
polity score (Figure 2).
Kenyatta died unexpectedly of natural causes in 1978 and Moi, the sitting vice 
president, took power as specified in the constitution. Moi continued in the footsteps 
of Kenyatta and further consolidated the one-party state. Following an attempted 
coup in 1982 led by Kikuyu officers, he switched from a Kikuyu-Kalenjin coalition 
to an alliance between Kalenjins, Luhyas, and numerically smaller groups, similar 
to the KADU alliance he had once led. The heads of parastatal enterprises, the mil-
itary, police, and the security apparatus were rapidly replaced with Moi’s Kalenjin 
loyalists (Widner 1992).
6 Nairobi and Mombasa were (and are) the two largest cities in Kenya and Trans Nzoia is highly urbanized. 
Economic opportunities in these agglomerations attracted a diverse group of migrants. 
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The early 1990s saw an increase in both internal and external pressures for 
African leaders to introduce democracy, with the end of the Cold War being a cat-
alyst (Barkan 1994). The suspension of overseas development assistance from the 
Paris Group of Donors forced Moi to legalize opposition parties, and Kenya held 
multiparty elections in 1992 for the first time since the 1960s. However, while Moi 
had amended the constitution to allow for multiparty competition, in parallel he had 
also successfully consolidated the strength of the Office of the President. His abuse 
of the state machinery and widespread vote fraud, together with the inability of the 
opposition to coordinate on a single candidate, handed Moi victory in both the 1992 
and the 1997 multiparty elections.
The return to democracy is widely accepted to have brought significant changes 
in the nature of Kenyan politics and civil society. The emergence of a freer press, 
including private ownership of media, the growth of civil society organizations, and 
of parliamentary accountability committees, as well as a reduction in blatant human 
rights abuses by the security apparatus, were all arguably triggered by the emergence 
of political competition. These trends are not unique to Kenya, as illustrated by the 
Africa-wide changes in polity scores seen in Figure 2. The process put in motion by 
these civil society changes helped make possible the relatively free national election 
of 2002, which was won by the opposition for the first time, with Mwai Kibaki, an 
ethnic Kikuyu, becoming president, marking the country’s first democratic transi-
tion of power. Moi himself did not run for president in the 2002 elections, adher-
ing to the constitutional provision barring a third term in office. Kenya’s emerging 
democracy has been tested since 2002, most notably in the 2007 elections.7
C. Road Investment Data in Kenya
Road building is the single largest development expenditure item in Kenya’s 
Annual Development Budget.8 Over the period of study (1963–2011), road spend-
ing on average represents 15.20 percent of the total central government’s develop-
ment budget, compared to figures of 5.50 percent, 5.70 percent, and 6.50 percent for 
expenditures in education, health, and water, respectively.
Unlike these other public goods, which derive significant funding from local 
communities (in the form of harambee funding), investments in roads are almost 
entirely centrally funded and controlled. The expense and visibility of roads proj-
ects has implied that the Office of the President exercises strict oversight over road 
investment decisions. Requests for road projects are fed into the Ministry of Public 
Works by provincial and district commissioners who are nominated by (and hence 
loyal to) the president.9 The Office of the President then coordinates national road 
funding decisions with the Ministry of Finance.
7 Exit polls in 2007 suggested that Raila Odinga (an ethnic Luo) had defeated Kibaki but the electoral com-
mission granted Kibaki victory, leading to claims of electoral fraud and widespread and intense ethnic violence. 
8 Kenya’s Total Annual Budget in our study period is composed of the Development Budget and Recurrent 
Expenditure. Unfortunately, Recurrent Expenditure is only reported as national aggregates and thus cannot be used 
for district-level analysis. 
9 There was disproportionate representation from the president’s ethnic group in the share of both provincial and 
district commissioners in the 1980s (Barkan and Chege 1989). 
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The limited availability of long-run subnational data on public goods in Kenya 
(and other African countries) has meant that we have had to devote considerable 
time and effort in constructing two measures of road investment, one based on 
expenditure and the other based on maps.10 The necessary data to construct similar 
district-year panels for the 1963–2011 period for other public goods such as health 
and education do not exist for Kenya.11
Our main measure of road investment is expenditures on new roads annually by 
district during 1963–2011, obtained from the development estimates of Kenya (see 
online Appendix A). These contain road project level data that details the expendi-
ture on a comprehensive list of individual road projects on an annual basis (i.e., a 
paved road from location A to location B through location C, at total cost X). When 
a road project spans locations in more than one district, we use geographic informa-
tion system (GIS) data to understand the layout of the road project and quantify the 
relative numbers of kilometers (km) in each district. We then decompose expendi-
ture across the relevant districts assuming an equal distribution of costs along the 
construction of the total length of the road.
A convenient feature of roads is that they are easy to observe on the ground. 
Our second measure of road investment comes from Michelin maps, which cap-
ture the actual physical extent of paved roads. Paved roads account for the majority 
of road expenditures, and their spread can be reliably tracked across our period. 
As these maps are made by French engineers in Paris assisted by Michelin offices 
(mainly gas stations and tire outlets) throughout Africa, they are an independent 
non-governmental source of data on road investment. This data should therefore not 
be affected by the concern that road spending, as reported by the government, might 
not be accurately recorded. It is simply a measure of the physical manifestation of 
paved roads. Digitization of the Michelin maps thus provides us with an indepen-
dent check on whether there is ethnic favoritism in road building and whether such 
favoritism is affected by democracy.
The limitation of this second source of data is that these maps are only published 
in certain years. In particular, maps were produced for the following years: 1964, 
1967, 1969, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1992, and 2002. To construct our 
GIS dataset, we use a recent GIS layer containing contemporary paved roads and 
then use the 11 Michelin maps in order to recreate the evolution of the paved road 
network backward in time. Consistency of paved road legend labels across maps 
implies that we can create a district-map year panel dataset of the length of paved 
roads (measured in kilometers) by splicing the historical road maps with the 1963 
district boundaries.
To assess what the paved road network might have looked like in the absence 
of ethnic favoritism, we also construct a counterfactual paved road network for 
the 1964–2002 period. To do this, we take the 42 urban settlements that existed in 
Kenya in 1962 and the 7 urban settlements near borders in neighboring countries.12 
There are 1,155 potential bilateral connections between these settlements. We use 
10 See online Appendix A for details on construction of the two road investment data series and online Appendix 
Table A2 for summary statistics on the main variables. 
11 For public goods other than roads, the main issue is that we cannot disaggregate expenditures by district 
across the 1963–2011 period. 
12 Towns and cities with populations 2,000 or greater (see online Appendix Figure A6). 
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the first post-independence Michelin map in 1964 to identify preexisting bilateral 
connections, and we then rank the remaining settlement pairs according to their 
market potential, namely, the sum of the populations of the settlement pair divided 
by Euclidean distance between them (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999). This is 
a commonly used metric in economic geography and trade, and is also employed 
by transport planners in deciding where to place roads. We then determine the total 
kilometers of paved road actually built between 1964 and 1967 and allocate them 
according to the market potential ranking of settlement pairs. We repeat this process 
for each map period, until we exhaust the total length of paved roads that were actu-
ally constructed in Kenya between 1964 and 2002.13 Therefore our counterfactual 
network has the same length of paved roads as the real network. This counterfactual 
thus tells us where and when paved roads would have been built if a social planner 
was maximizing market potential, based on information available at independence.
Actual and counterfactual paved road networks are presented in Figure 3 for the 
map years which coincide with political and leadership transitions—1969, 1979, 
1992, and 2002.14 Panel A portrays the actual paved road series and provides some 
useful first insights into ethnic favoritism in road construction. Between 1979 and 
1992 (the Moi autocracy period), the paved road network visibly expands into 
Kalenjin districts whereas the road network in Kikuyu districts remains largely fro-
zen. Then between 1992 and 2002 (the Moi democracy period) paved roads expand 
more evenly across the country including into districts dominated by tribes other 
than Kalenjins and Kikuyus. Panel B exhibits the counterfactual road series and 
shows a very different pattern. Roads are less concentrated in Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
districts and display a more pronounced “hub and spoke” pattern, whereby Nairobi 
and other major urban centers are connected to a wider range of towns and cities, 
including many that are in districts that never share the ethnicity of the president. 
Comparing the counterfactual and actual series we see that there is much more inten-
sive road construction around the coastal port of Mombasa and in the  non-Kikuyu 
and non-Kalenjin hinterlands.
In online Appendix Table A3, we list the top 20 and bottom 20 bilateral road 
connections based on market potential. Is is clear that the top ranked pairs connect 
large cities to nearby settlements, many of which are not in Kikuyu or Kalenjin 
areas. The net result is a counterfactual road network that is much more dispersed 
across the country and which connects more urban centers. In Figure 3 we see that in 
2002, after a decade of democracy, actual and counterfactual road networks resem-
ble one another much more closely relative to the autocratic period 1979 and 1992 
maps. Yet despite more equal treatment of different ethnic groups under democracy, 
 non-Kikuyu and non-Kalenjin districts are never fully compensated for the lack of 
road investment in autocratic periods (see the 2002 maps in Figure 3).
To aid interpretation, for each of our measures of district-level road investment—
the annual expenditure series, the actual paved road series, and the counterfactual 
13 To take account of topography, we assume paved roads are constructed along the shortest, unpaved connec-
tion existing between settlements in 1964. 
14 In addition to this road length counterfactual, we also construct an analogous road expenditure counterfactual 
series. In online Appendix Figure A2 we see that the market potential expenditure counterfactual maps for 1969, 
1979, 1992, and 2002 look very similar to the market potential paved road counterfactual maps in Figure 3 (refer to 
online Appendix B for detail on the construction of the counterfactual series). 
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paved road series—we normalize the share of national road investment that a district 
receives relative to the population share of that district. The main outcome variable 
in our empirical analysis is the share of road expenditure received by a district (out 
of the total national road development budget that year) divided by the population 
share of the district in the national population (in 1962).15 This statistic has a nat-
ural interpretation: a value of 1 implies that a district received road spending that 
is exactly proportional to its population.16 Values greater than (less than) 1 denote 
spending that is above (below) the national per capita average. Specifically, a value 
15 If road spending in district  d and year  t is denoted by  EX P dt and district population in 1962 by  PO P d, 1962 , 
while total national road spending is  EX P t and national population in 1962 is  PO P 1962 , then the main road spending 
measure can be expressed as:
 roa d dt =  
 ( EX P dt  _____EX P t )  _________
 ( PO P d, 1962  _______PO P 1962  ) 
 =  
 ( EX P dt  _______ PO P d, 1962 ) _________  ( EX P t ______ PO P 1962 ) 
  .
16 This empirical benchmark lines up with our theoretical model where the optimal path of public expenditure 
equalizes expenditures per capita across districts. 
Figure 3. Evolution of Kenya’s Paved Road Network
Notes: These figures illustrate the evolution of Kenya’s actual and counterfactual paved road networks for key polit-
ical and leadership transition years: 1969 (transition from democracy to autocracy), 1979 (from Kenyatta [Kikuyu] 
to Moi [Kalenjin] in 1978), 1992 (return to democracy), and 2002 (from Moi [Kalenjin] to Kibaki [Kikuyu]). 
The counterfactual network sequentially paves the unpaved bilateral connections with the highest market potential 
(based on population and distance). Border towns are not illustrated due to space constraints. Road maps are over-
laid on ethnic demographics to illustrate the two presidential coethnic districts, the Kikuyus and Kalenjins. These 
are seven districts dominated by Kikuyus and six dominated by Kalenjins. Coethnicity (d, t) is defined if  ≥ 50 per-
cent of the district’s (d ) population is coethnic to the president in year t. Data sources and construction are described 
in online Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
Panel A. Actual network
Panel B. Counterfactual network based on population and distance (market potential)
2002199219791969
2002199219791969
Kikuyu districts Kalenjin districtsPaved road Nairobi Town/city (1962)
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of 2 for this measure denotes a district that is receiving twice as much road spending 
as the national per capita average.
For both the actual and counterfactual paved road series, we construct a parallel 
measure for paved road construction (in km) per capita by district, using a measure 
of paved road length per capita in the district divided by average paved road length 
per capita nationally, as an alternative district road outcome. This measure has the 
same interpretation, with one denoting road construction on par with the national 
average, and values greater than one denoting additional construction. This data 
allows us to perform two distinct tests. First, we can examine whether coethnic 
districts get more road investment relative to their national population share and 
whether this varies across autocracy and democracy. Second, we assess whether our 
counterfactual road network, which was built to maximize market potential, shows 
any evidence of ethnic favoritism both across the 1963–2011 period and within and 
outside autocratic periods.
III. Methods and Results
A. Methods
We seek to estimate the relationship between the ethnicity of the president and 
public expenditures in districts demographically dominated by his coethnics. In the 
period under examination, we have Kikuyu presidents (1963–1978 and 2003–2011) 
and a Kalenjin president (1979–2002). There are 7 districts dominated by Kikuyus 
and 6 dominated by Kalenjins, out of 41 in total. We present our results using two 
approaches: a graphical approach and a regression approach.
In our first approach, we graphically examine how the ratio of a district’s share 
of road spending or road construction relative to its population share (i.e.,  roa d dt ) 
varies during the post-independence period. We divide districts in two ways. First 
by whether or not, in a given year, the majority ethnic group in a district is the same 
as that of the president. This allows us to visually assess whether districts that are 
coethnic with the president receive a higher share of spending on roads relative to 
their share in the national population. We are particularly interested in analyzing 
whether this bias is more or less pronounced in democratic periods relative to auto-
cratic periods. Second, we examine the evolution of districts that are dominated by 
Kikuyus and Kalenjins. Since all Kenyan presidents have been either ethnic Kikuyu 
or Kalenjin, this allows us to examine what happens to road spending in districts 
when they shift in and out of being coethnic with the president. A focus here again 
is on whether being coethnic during autocratic periods results in districts attracting 
a higher share of road resources relative to democratic periods. This comparison is 
of particular interest as the transition from democracy to autocracy in 1969 took 
place under the same president (Kenyatta), as did the transition from autocracy to 
democracy in 1992 (Moi).
In the regression approach, our main estimating equation takes the following form:
  roa d dt =  γ d +  α t + β(coethnic distric t dt ) 
 + δ(coethnic distric t dt × democrac y t ) + θ( X d1963 × [t − 1963]) +  u dt ,
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where the dependent variable is the road spending or road construction measure for 
year  t and district  d as described above.17 To capture coethnicity with the president, 
we use an indicator variable ( coethnic  distric t dt ) that takes a value of 1 for districts 
where at least 50 percent of the population has the same ethnic affiliation as the serv-
ing president. The  democrac y t term is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 
during periods of multiparty democracy (1963–1969 and 2003–2011).18  X d1963 is a 
vector of baseline demographic, economic, and geographic variables all obtained in 
the early- to mid-1960s that might affect road spending and construction. We inter-
act these initial conditions with linear time trends [t − 1963] to allow their impact 
to vary over time. This allows us to control for a wide range of factors that might 
influence where road spending or road construction takes place. The regression also 
controls for district fixed effects ( γ d ) and year fixed effects ( α t ), and standard errors 
are clustered at the district level.
B. Graphical Analysis
The first results are presented in Figure 4. We plot the average  roa d dt measure for 
districts that are coethnic with the president in year  t and those that are not. The solid 
vertical lines, in 1969 and 1992, capture regime transitions away from democracy 
and back to democracy, respectively. The broken vertical lines, in 1979 and 2002, 
capture presidential transitions. Two interesting patterns emerge. The first is that 
during periods of autocracy (the 1970s and 1980s), the ratio of district share of road 
expenditures to district share of population is always above 1 for coethnic districts 
and below 1 for non-coethnic districts, which is strongly indicative of ethnic favorit-
ism. The second is that during periods of democracy (the 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s), 
the ratio is consistently lower and tends to be near 1 on average for both types of 
districts, implying little or no favoritism.
Three transitions in Figure 4 are particularly noteworthy. The first is the rapid 
post-1969 rise of average  roa d dt from 1 to above 2. Even with the same president in 
power (Kenyatta), the switch from democracy to autocracy leads to road spending 
more than doubling in coethnic districts over the course of a few years. The second 
is that this favoritism is maintained and intensified after 1979 (when Moi, an ethnic 
Kalenjin, takes power), despite the fact that the set of districts that are coethnic with 
the president is now completely distinct from those pre-1979. The third is that when 
democracy returns in 1992 the  roa d dt measure gradually falls from above 2 to around 
1 even though the same president (Moi) is in place. Democracy clearly appears to 
have value in terms of spreading the single biggest component of Kenyan public 
development expenditures more evenly across districts.
As noted above, only two ethnic groups, Kikuyus and Kalenjins, produced pres-
idents during the study period. Figure 5 categorizes districts by whether the major-
ity of the district population is Kikuyu, Kalenjin, or from another ethnic group. 
17 For both spending and construction we have 41 districts as defined by the 1963 district boundaries. For 
spending we have annual data for 49 years and hence our sample is 2009 observations. For paved road construction 
there are 11 Michelin maps between 1963 and 2002 and hence 410 observations as we use the change in paved road 
length between map periods. 
18 We define democratic years as those when the constitution of Kenya allowed multiple parties to contest 
elections. 
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Kikuyu districts receive road spending in line with their population share during 
the early democratic period. Following the banning of opposition political parties in 
1969, road spending concentrates in these districts, rising to more than double that 
predicted by population share. This trend of favoring Kikuyu districts ends when 
the Kikuyu president (Kenyatta) dies in 1978. In fact, there is a striking decline in 
road expenditure in Kikuyu districts, and a corresponding increase in road expen-
diture in Kalenjin districts timed exactly after Kenyatta’s death in 1978, suggesting 
that Moi had the authority to rapidly divert road resources to his coethnic districts. 
This pattern becomes even more pronounced after the failed Kikuyu-led coup 
attempt in 1982.
The rise in spending on Kalenjin districts is truly meteoric:  roa d dt rises from 
around 0.5 pre-1978 to close to 3 post-1978, representing a six-fold increase in 
relative road spending per capita in these districts. This highly elevated  roa d dt level 
is maintained throughout the Moi autocratic period, as the Kikuyu  roa d dt falls back 
down toward unity. The return of democracy under Moi in 1992 appears to reduce 
his ability to maintain this high degree of ethnic favoritism, and the Kalenjin dis-
trict  roa d dt measure drifts back down toward 1 as democracy gradually strength-
ens. Diminished favoritism for districts that are coethnic with the president during 
periods of democracy is also associated with greater spending for the majority of 
districts in Kenya that are neither majority Kikuyu nor Kalenjin. As Figure 5 demon-
strates, the “other” ethnic districts line has a U-shaped pattern, being close to unity 
in the 1960s, then falling below unity in the 1970s and 1980s, and rising back toward 
Figure 4. Road Expenditure in Presidential Coethnic  
and Non-Coethnic Districts, 1963–2011
Notes: This figure plots the ratio between the share of road development expenditure in district 
d in year t to the share of population in 1962 for district d for coethnic and non-coethnic dis-
tricts. A district d is defined as coethnic if  ≥ 50 percent of the district’s population is coethnic 
to the president in year t. The two vertical solid lines represent political transitions: December 
1969 is the transition from democracy to autocracy, while December 1992 is the return of 
democracy. The two vertical dotted lines represent leadership transitions: from Kenyatta 
(Kikuyu) to Moi (Kalenjin) in August 1978, and from Moi (Kalenjin) to Kibaki (Kikuyu) in 
December 2002. Data sources and construction are described in online Appendix A and Table 
A2 of online Appendix E.
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unity in the 1990s and 2000s. Democracy seems to have a leveling influence in 
ensuring that Kenyan districts receive roads resources roughly in line with their 
share of population irrespective of whether or not they share the ethnicity of the 
president.19
The fact that all non-Kikuyu and non-Kalenjin ethnic groups (which constitute 
70 percent of the population at independence) get road spending allocations well 
below the national average during every year of Kenya’s 23 years of autocratic rule, 
and at best achieve parity during democratic periods, is strongly indicative of misal-
location in road investment.
C. Regression Analysis
In Table 1 we move beyond the graphical analysis and employ the regression 
framework specified above. Column 1 of panel A confirms that there is strong evi-
dence of ethnic favoritism in Kenya over the whole study period. The coefficient 
estimate of 0.97 in this specification implies that, on average, districts that are coe-
thnic with the president receive roughly double the amount of roads investment 
relative to their share in the population. Given that roads account for approximately 
19 In online Appendix Figure A3, we break out the Kamba-Luhya-Luo ethnic groups, the three other largest 
ethnic groups in Kenya, from the numerically smaller groups. Both groupings exhibit the same U-shaped pattern as 
in Figure 5, suggesting that larger ethnic groups do not have more clout in attracting road investment and that what 
matters most is being coethnic with the president. 
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Figure 5. Road Expenditure in Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Other Districts, 1963–2011 
Notes: This figure plots the ratio between the share of road development expenditure in dis-
trict d in year t to the share of population in 1962 for Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and other ethnic dis-
tricts. Kikuyu (and in turn Kalenjin and other ethnic) districts are defined as those districts if 
≥ 50 percent of the district’s population is Kikuyu (and in turn Kalenjin and other ethnic). 
A Kikuyu president is in office during 1963–1978, a Kalenjin president in 1978–2002, and a 
Kikuyu again in 2002–2011. The vertical lines represent political transitions, while the vertical 
dotted lines represent leadership transitions as described in the Figure 4 notes. Data sources 
and construction are described in online Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
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one-sixth of all central government development spending, this represents a highly 
consequential degree of ethnic bias.
This central result remains robust when we sequentially add a set of factors 
that might influence road investment patterns. These include controls for demog-
raphy (district population, area, urbanization rate—column 2), economic activity 
(district total earnings and employment in the formal sector, value of cash crop 
production for export—column 3), economic geography (being on the main 
 Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala corridor, bordering another country, distance to 
Nairobi—column 4). These controls, which are either time invariant or are mea-
sured at the start of the study period, are interacted with linear time trends to allow 
their effects to grow over time. Our preferred specification is that in column 4, which 
includes all these controls interacted with time trends. This helps to reassure us that 
the ethnic favoritism result is not being driven by the influence of these factors. 
In column 5 we observe that the result is even robust to including district-specific 
time trends. Regardless of econometric specification, the central result that coethnic 
districts, on average, receive twice the level of road expenditure between 1963 and 
2011 is highly robust.
Table 1—Road Expenditure, Ethnicity, and Democratic Changes, 1963–2011
Dependent variable
 
Share of road development expenditure [d, t]    _______________________________   
Population share [d, 1962] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Coethnic district [d, t] 0.97*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 1.00*** 0.95**
(0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.39)
Panel B
Coethnic district [d, t] 1.57*** 1.62*** 1.64*** 1.72*** 1.55***
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.51)
Coethnic district [d, t] × democracy [t] −1.11* −1.24* −1.27** −1.32** −1.09*
(0.61) (0.63) (0.63) (0.62) (0.58)
F-test ( p-value) 1.07 0.76 0.73 0.88 1.14
 H 0 : Coethnic + (coethnic × democracy) = 0 [0.31] [0.39] [0.40] [0.36] [0.29]
Observations 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009
Year and district fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Population, area, urbanization rate) × trend No Yes Yes Yes No
(Earnings, employment, cash crops) × trend No No Yes Yes No
(Main highway, border, dist. Nairobi) × trend No No No Yes No
District time trends No No No No Yes
Notes: Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on annual district-year expenditure panel dataset of 41 districts for 
the period of 1963–2011. Coethnic district [d, t] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if  ≥ 50 percent of the district’s (d ) 
population is coethnic to the president in year t. Democracy [t] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if year t is a demo-
cratic year. Democratic years are identified as those when the constitution of Kenya allows multiple parties to con-
test elections. The F-test is for the hypothesis that coethnic and non-coethnic districts have equal outcomes under 
democracy. Columns 2–5 include initial controls interacted with a time trend (1963–2011). These controls are (i) 
demographic: district population (1962), district size (square km), and urbanization rate (1962); (ii) economic 
activity: district formal total earnings (1966), formal employment (1963), and value of cash crop exports (1965); 
and (iii) economic geography: binary indicator equal to 1 if district is on the Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala corridor, 
binary indicator equal to 1 if the district borders Uganda or Tanzania, and district centroid euclidean distance to 
Nairobi (km). Robust standard errors clustered at district level are reported in the parentheses. Data sources and 
construction are described in online Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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We next test if ethnic favoritism is affected by whether a national democratic or 
autocratic regime is in place. In panel B of Table 1, column 1 indicates that ethnic 
favoritism in road spending falls significantly during democratic periods. Indeed, 
an  F -test indicates that there is no significant evidence of ethnic favoritism within 
periods of democracy in Kenya (  p -value = 0.31). This is the second main result of 
the paper. Democracy limits the ability of the president to favor coethnics, in effect 
forcing him to share public resources more evenly across the population. This is 
equivalent to a drop in  θ in our theoretical model toward unity. That even imper-
fect forms of democracy, such as that experienced in Kenya in the 1960s and again 
 post-1992, can reduce ethnic favoritism in this way is a striking finding.
In the remaining columns of panel B of Table 1, we see that this second result 
is again robust to sequentially adding in controls for demography (column 2), eco-
nomic activity (column 3), and economic geography (column 4), and to inclusion 
of district-specific time trends (column 5). Across all columns, the  F -test indicates 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that ethnic favoritism in road building is absent 
during periods of democracy. The 1.72 coefficient on  coethni c dt in column 4 of panel 
B implies that there is almost a three-fold increase in road spending in coethnic dis-
tricts during autocratic periods. This can be seen in Figure 4 where our road favoritism 
measure rises from around 1 in the 1960s to almost 3 in the 1970s and 1980s and then 
falls back toward 1 in the post-1992 period. The coefficient estimates of −1.32 on the 
( coethni c dt × democrac y t ) interaction in column 4 of panel B term captures the 
elimination of ethnic favoritism during periods of democracy.
In Table 2 we use our second  roa d dt measure, the share of the length of paved 
roads constructed in a district relative to its population share, and reproduce the 
specifications in Table 1. In panel A we see that coethnic districts receive between 
3–5 times the kilometers of paved roads per capita relative to the national average. 
This central result is robust when different initial characteristics of districts inter-
acted with time trends are included in the regression (columns 1–4) and when we 
include district time trends (column 5). In our preferred specification in column 4, 
the coefficient estimate is 3.71, implying that coethnic districts have almost five 
times the length of paved roads built. Ethnic favoritism as measured by paved road 
construction is therefore more than twice as pronounced as that measured by road 
expenditures. This might be because paved roads are highly visible and signal mod-
ernization and progress, and presidents may feel that investing in them may be a 
more effective means of securing the support of coethnics relative to investing in 
non-paved roads and earthen tracks.20
In panel B of Table 2 we see that the tendency to favor coethnic districts with 
paved roads is again greatly diminished during periods of democracy. Indeed, across 
all specifications, we find that the reduction in this bias during democratic periods is 
such that we cannot reject the hypothesis that ethnic favoritism is absent during peri-
ods of democracy. In column 4, the coefficient estimate on  coethni c dt is 4.26, imply-
ing that in autocratic periods more than five times the length of paved roads are built 
in coethnic districts relative to the national average. The coefficient estimate on 
( coethni c dt × democrac y t ) of −2.38 implies that this bias is reduced in democratic 
20 Or indeed relative to other public goods which are less visible to the public. 
1836 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW juNE 2015
periods, and indeed the  F -test (  p -value = 0.33) confirms that we cannot reject that 
there was no ethnic favoritism during these periods.
The degree to which results match up using two independently collected datasets 
on road expenditure (Table 1) and road building (Table 2) is reassuring. It increases 
our confidence in the robustness of the two key findings of this paper: (i) there is 
extensive favoritism toward the president’s coethnics in road investment in Kenya, 
and (ii) this favoritism is largely eliminated during periods of democracy.
In Table 3 we run the same specification as column 4 in Tables 1 and 2 but use 
our counterfactual paved road data series (see online Appendix B). We construct 
three counterfactuals, one based on connecting settlement pairs with the largest 
joint populations (column 1), one based on connecting settlement pairs which are 
closest together (column 2), and one based on connecting settlement pairs whose 
market potential is the highest (column 3).21 The main focus of our analysis is col-
umn 3 of Table 3. Consistent with Figure 3 which shows that the counterfactual 
road network is more dispersed that the actual road network, we find no evidence in 
21 Namely, settlement pairs whose sum of populations divided by the Euclidean distance between them is largest 
are connected first (see online Appendix B and online Appendix Table A3). 
Table 2—Road Building, Ethnicity, and Democratic Changes, 1964–2002
Dependent variable
 
Share of paved road construction [d, t]    _______________________________ 
Population share [d, 1962] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Coethnic district [d, t] 1.91** 1.94* 2.20** 3.71** 3.92*
(0.94) (0.99) (1.09) (1.69) (2.20)
Panel B
Coethnic district [d, t] 3.00** 3.03** 3.19** 4.26** 3.28
(1.23) (1.26) (1.33) (1.74) (2.21)
Coethnic district [d, t] × democracy [t] −3.55** −3.61** −3.45** −2.38* −3.27**
(1.38) (1.36) (1.32) (1.36) (1.39)
F-test ( p-value) 0.44 0.49 0.10 0.98 0.00
 H 0 : Coethnic + (coethnic × democracy) = 0 [0.51] [0.49] [0.75] [0.33] [1.00]
Observations 410 410 410 410 410
Year and district fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Population, area, urbanization rate) × trend No Yes Yes Yes No
(Earnings, employment, cash crops) × trend No No Yes Yes No
(Main highway, border, dist. Nairobi) × trend No No No Yes No
District time trends No No No No Yes
Notes: OLS regressions on district-year map panel dataset of 41 districts for the period of 1964–2002. Maps are 
published in the following years: 1964, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1992, and 2002. We 
measure paved road construction as the difference between the paved length across two map years. Coethnic dis-
trict [d, t] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if  ≥ 50 percent of district’s (d ) population is coethnic to the president in 
year, t. Democracy [t] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if year t is a democratic year. Democratic years are identified 
as those when the constitution of Kenya allows multiple parties to contest elections. The F-test is for the hypoth-
esis that coethnic and non-coethnic districts have equal outcomes under democracy. Columns 2–5 include initial 
controls interacted with a time trend (1964–2002). Refer to Table 1 notes for description of controls. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at district level are reported in the parentheses. Data sources and construction are described in 
online Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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our  counterfactual simulation that coethnic districts would have more kilometers of 
paved road than would be predicted by their population share across the 1964–2002 
period (column 3 of panel A of Table 3). This helps dispel worries that our ethnic 
favoritism result from panel A of Tables 1 and 2 is being driven by the fact that 
coethnic districts may be receiving more road investment because they had higher 
market potential.22 If paved roads had been allocated to maximize market potential, 
then districts coethnic with the president would not have been favored relative to 
non-coethnic districts.
In column 3 of panel B in Table 3, we see no evidence of ethnic favoritism in 
counterfactual paved road construction in either autocratic or democratic periods. 
This result seems intuitive as our paved road counterfactual is based solely on the 
22 Column 3 of panel A of online Appendix Table A4 shows the same result for the counterfactual road expen-
diture series. 
Table 3—Counterfactual Road Building, Ethnicity, and Democratic Changes, 1964–2002
Dependent variable
 
Share of paved road construction [d, t]    _______________________________ 
Population share [d, 1962] 
Population and distance
Counterfactual ranking Population Distance (market potential)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A
Coethnic district [d, t] 0.22 −0.56 0.67
(0.44) (1.21) (1.03)
Panel B
Coethnic district [d, t] 0.20 −0.57 0.34
(0.52) (1.14) (1.08)
Coethnic district [d, t] × democracy [t] 0.08 0.05 1.38
(1.39) (1.34) (2.24)
F-test ( p-value) 0.05 0.08 0.64
 H 0 : Coethnic + (coethnic × democracy) = 0 [0.82] [0.78] [0.43]
Observations 410 410 410
Year and district fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Controls × trend Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS regressions using counterfactual dataset based on maps for the period of 1964–2002. Maps are published 
in the following years: 1964, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1992, and 2002. The counterfactual 
dataset sequentially paves the network starting with the unpaved bilateral connections of towns/cities i and j with 
the highest value of the ranking criteria. We use 42 towns/cities in Kenya and 7 border towns/cities in neighboring 
countries classified in 1962 with populations of  ≥ 2,000 habitants. This results in 1,155 (= 41 × 41/2 + 42/7) 
bilateral connections across these towns/cities. In column 1, the counterfactual is based on maximizing population 
( P ij ) between two bilateral pairs  ( P i +  P j ) to obtain the ranking of the connections. In column 2, the counterfactual 
is based on minimizing distance between two bilateral pairs ( D ij ) to obtain the ranking of the connections. In col-
umn 3, the counterfactual is based on maximizing market potential, incorporating both the population and distance 
between two town/city pairs,  ( P i +  P j )/ D ij . Coethnic district [d, t] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if  ≥ 50 percent of 
district’s (d ) population is coethnic to the president in year t. Democracy [t] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if year t 
is a democratic year. Democratic years are identified as those when the constitution of Kenya allows multiple parties 
to contest elections. The F-test is for the hypothesis that coethnic and non-coethnic districts have equal outcomes 
under democracy. Columns 1–3 include initial controls interacted with a time trend (1964–2002). Refer to Table 1 
notes for description of controls. Robust standard errors clustered at district level are reported in the parentheses. 
Data sources and construction are described in online Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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population of urban settlements at independence and the distance between these 
urban settlement pairs. Therefore changes between democracy and autocracy (or 
vice versa) should not affect where paved roads are optimally built. The result is 
nonetheless important as it also helps to dispel concerns that the northwestern expan-
sion of paved roads from Nairobi initially into Kikuyu districts and then into Kalenjin 
districts just represented a natural expansion of the paved road network based on 
market potential, which just happened to coincide with political regime changes. 
Indeed as Figure 3 illustrates, the natural expansion of the road network based on 
market potential was toward a road network that was much more  dispersed across 
Kenya and was unaffected by democracy. Column 3 of panel B in Table 3 confirms 
that this is the case for the counterfactual district-map year paved road panel.23
To summarize the results of the counterfactual road construction exercise, if we 
compare results for actual road expenditure (Table 1), actual paved roads (Table 2), 
and counterfactual paved roads (Table 3), there is clear evidence (from Tables 1 
and 2) that (i) political leaders in Kenya have been skewing road investment toward 
coethnic districts, and (ii) that democracy has largely eliminated this tendency to 
favor coethnic districts. The absence of both these effects using counterfactual road 
construction patterns in Table 3 strongly suggests that ethnic favoritism has led to 
misallocation in actual road construction relative to the road network that would 
have been built if Kenyan leaders were trying to maximize market potential.
Economic activity in Kenya is concentrated along the Mombasa-Nairobi-
Kampala corridor, with the densest population settlements concentrated in the area 
to the northwest of Nairobi, much of which has large Kikuyu and Kalenjin pop-
ulations. As an additional check that our results are not driven by some spurious 
correlation between coethnicity and economic potential, we drop subsets of districts 
which credibly could have higher market potential from the analysis and assess 
whether our main results still hold (see online Appendix Table A5). In column 1 we 
drop former White Highland settler districts (located predominantly to the north-
west of Nairobi) that had been the focus of economic development under British 
rule, in column 2 we drop Nairobi and adjacent districts, in column 3 we exclude 
the 15 districts on the Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala corridor, in column 4 we exclude 
the 9 districts on Nairobi-Kampala corridor, and in column 5 we exclude the 5 rich-
est districts in 1962. In all cases, the existence of ethnic favoritism (panel A) and 
its mitigation under democracy (panel B) remains robust. This suggests that the 
initial concentration of road investment in Kikuyu districts around Nairobi (under 
Kenyatta), followed by the shift to Kalenjin districts in the northwest (under Moi), 
and then the spread of road investments into non-coethnic districts after democracy 
returned in 1992, are not simply driven by roads just tracking economic potential.
It is informative to break down the results into the five leadership periods seen 
in Figure 1—Kenyatta democracy, Kenyatta autocracy, Moi autocracy, Moi democ-
racy, and Kibaki democracy. This is needed to check whether what we are observing 
is a general phenomena, or one related to a particular leadership regime in Kenya. 
For example, we would want to know whether both early (1960s) and later (1990s, 
2000s) democracy were effective in mitigating ethnic favoritism. To look at this, 
23 Online Appendix Table A4 runs the same specification for the counterfactual expenditure series and also finds 
no evidence of ethnic favoritism in either autocratic or democratic periods. 
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for each of the leadership regimes shown in Figure 1, we regress our road spending 
favoritism index  roa d dt on indicators that capture whether a district has a major-
ity ( ≥ 50 percent) Kikuyu or Kalenjin population. The comparison districts are 
those that do not have either of these attributes. Coefficients from each of these five 
 s eparate regressions are reported in Table 4. Guided by our model we can use these 
coefficients to estimate regime-specific measures of constraints on the executive ( θ ), 
thus enabling us to examine how these change across regime transitions and with 
time varying polity scores (see Section IV).
The pattern of the coefficient estimates on the Kikuyu and Kalenjin indicators 
across periods is telling. During the Kenyatta democracy period (1963–1969), there 
is no significant difference between the coefficients on the Kikuyu and Kalenjin indi-
cators (  p -value = 0.70). In the Kenyatta autocracy period (1970–1978) the Kikuyu 
indicator becomes positive and statistically significant, and the Kikuyu-Kalenjin dif-
ference is also statistically significant (  p -value = 0.01). During the Moi autocracy 
period (1979–1992) things flip around and now the Kalenjin indicator is positive and 
statistically significant, the Kikuyu indicator is not and the two are marginally sig-
nificantly different (  p -value = 0.08). With the transition back to democracy during 
the Moi democracy period (1993–2002), both indicators lose statistical significance, 
as does the difference between the two (  p -value = 0.14) and this pattern also holds 
under the Kibaki democracy period (2003–2011,  p -value = 0.33). The results in 
Table 4 indicate that there is no evidence of ethnic favoritism in either the early 
Table 4—Road Expenditure, Ethnicity, and Democratic Changes:  
Political and Leadership Transitions, 1963–2011
Dependent variable
 
Share of road development expenditure [d, t]    _______________________________   
Population share [d, 1962] 
Leader KENYATTA MOI KIBAKI
Regime Democracy Autocracy Autocracy Democracy Democracy
1963–1969 1970–1978 1979–1992 1993–2002 2003–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Kikuyu district [d, 1962] −0.44 0.96** 0.66 −0.88 −0.00
(0.39) (0.39) (0.49) (0.57) (0.63)
Kalenjin district [d, 1962] −0.57 −0.17 1.88*** 0.70 −0.60
(0.41) (0.32) (0.66) (1.11) (0.57)
F-test [ p-value] 0.15 6.92** 3.13* 2.26 0.99
 H 0 : Kikuyu district = Kalenjin district [0.70] [0.01] [0.08] [0.14] [0.33]
Observations 287 369 574 410 369
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects — — — — —
Notes: OLS regressions on annual district-year expenditure panel dataset of 41 districts for the period of 1963–
2011. Sample size varies in the column depending on duration of regime. Kikuyu (Kalenjin) district [d, 1962] is a 
binary indicator equal to 1 if  ≥ 50 percent of district’s (d ) population is Kikuyu (Kalenjin) according to the 1962 
population census. Other ethnic groups are the comparison group. Specifications do not include district fixed effects 
(the binary ethnic indicator variables are time invariant) and set of initial controls (due to limited sample size in 
each column). The F-test is for the hypothesis that Kikuyu and Kalenjin districts have equal outcomes. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at district level are reported in the parentheses. Data sources and construction are described in 
online Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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(1960s) or later (1990s, 2000s) democratic periods. It is during periods of autocracy 
that presidents blatantly favor coethnic districts in the allocation of road spending.
Online Appendix Tables A6 and A7 supply some additional robustness checks. In 
columns 1 and 2 of panel B in online Appendix Table A6, we move to a continuous 
measure of coethnicity based on share of population, and the two main empirical 
results continue to hold. In columns 3 and 4 of panel A we normalize the road 
expenditure share by the district’s land area share and find that our results are robust 
to this normalization. In columns 5–8 we replicate this analysis for the paved roads 
measure. Across both measures we find that our results from column 4 of Tables 1 
and 2 are robust to these modifications in variable construction. In online Appendix 
Table A7 we show that our results are also robust to interacting controls with year 
fixed effects (column 2), to including an additional control for the number of years a 
district has been coethnic with the president (column 3), and to correcting for spatial 
clustering (columns 4 and 5, Conley 1999).
D. Coalition Politics
Our focus has been on the impact of being coethnic with the president on road 
spending and paved road construction within a district, and on whether this changes 
under democracy. We find this makes sense given the nature of politics in many 
sub-Saharan African countries, where presidents traditionally enjoy considerable 
personal decision-making authority. However, it is possible that other members of 
the president’s cabinet also influence where road investment takes place. This intro-
duces a set of related but distinct issues pertaining to interethnic coalition formation. 
A lessening of ethnic favoritism under democracy, for example, may not be due to 
changing constraints on the president alone but rather to cabinets becoming more 
representative, or non-coethnic groups being targeted as a means of securing votes. 
While a full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, and does 
not feature in our theoretical model, we use our data to explore whether considering 
coalition politics significantly changes any of our main conclusions.
We assembled a dataset that codes the ethnicity of each cabinet member for each 
of the 13 central government cabinets between 1963 and 2011 (panel B of online 
Appendix Table A1). In an exhaustive set of regressions, we tested whether districts 
that are coethnic with the Public Works minister, or with ministers holding the most 
important cabinet portfolios (e.g., Finance, Home) receive more road spending but 
cannot reject the hypothesis that these effects are zero (not shown). This is further 
confirmation of the overriding power of presidents relative to other public officials 
in post-independence Kenya.
However, in column 2 of Table 5 we show the one exception: we find that districts 
that are coethnic with the vice president do have road expenditures significantly 
above the national average. A coefficient of 1.46 on the  VP – coethni c dt  measure tells 
us that during autocratic periods, districts receive 2.5 times the average amount of 
road expenditure relative to their population share: a large effect. The coefficient of 
−1.44 on ( VP – coethni c dt × democracy ) implies that this ethnic favoritism is non-
existent during periods of democracy, as is also confirmed by the F-test in column 2. 
What is also interesting in column 2 is that, during autocratic periods, districts that 
are coethnic with the president receive 3.5 times the amount of road expenditure 
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relative to districts that are neither coethnic with the president or vice president. This 
finding confirms that the president has been the dominant force in allocating road 
spending, but also shows that the vice president is able, to a more limited extent, to 
skew resource allocation.24 The fact that both these forms of favoritism disappear 
24 Throughout the post-independence period, the vice president was never of the same ethnicity as the president. 
Table 5—Role of the Vice-President, Cabinet Composition, and Coalition Politics, 1963–2011
Dependent variable    
Share of road dvt. expenditure [d, t]   _________________
Pop. share [d, 1962]    
Ethnic share of cabinet [e, t]______________  
Pop. share [e,1962]  
Share of road dvt. expenditure [d, t]   _________________
Pop. share [d, 1962] 
Table 1, column 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Coethnic district [d, t] 1.00*** 1.40** 0.65*** 0.92*** 1.40** 1.40**
(0.35) (0.58) (0.17) (0.08) (0.58) (0.58)
VP-Coethnic 0.54 0.45*** 0.54 0.54
 (district [d, t] or group [e, t]) (0.50) (0.13) (0.50) (0.50)
Panel B
Coethnic (district [d, t] or group [e, t]) 1.72*** 2.60*** 0.64*** 1.08*** 1.70*** 1.72***
(0.49) (0.71) (0.13) (0.31) (0.50) (0.49)
Coethnic (district [d, t] or group [e, t]) −1.32** −1.63** 0.02 0.03 −1.28** −1.32**
 × democracy [t] (0.62) (0.68) (0.28) (0.29) (0.66) (0.59)
VP-coethnic (district [d, t] 1.46** 0.94**
 or group [e, t]) (0.57) (0.34)
VP-coethnic (district [d, t] −1.44** −0.64
 or group [e, t]) × democracy [t] (0.61) (0.38)
Kamba-Luhya-Luo district [d, 1962] 0.20
 × democracy [t] (0.43)
Non-coethnic majority  < 80 percent 0.02
 [d, 1962] × democracy [t] (0.67)
F-test [ p-value] 0.88 2.49 5.87** 216.4*** 0.90 1.00
 H 0 : Coethnic +  (coethnic × democracy) = 0
[0.36] [0.12] [0.03] [0.00] [0.35] [0.32]
F-test [ p-value] 0.00 2.73
 H 0 : VP-coethnic +  (VP-coethnic × democracy) = 0
[0.98] [0.12]
Observations 2,009 2,009 169 169 2,009 2,009
Year and (district or group) 
 fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 are OLS regressions on annual district-year expenditure panel dataset (41 districts in the 
period 1963–2011). Columns 3 and 4 are OLS regressions on cabinet-ethnic year post-general elections (in the 
period 1963–2011), for the 13 main ethnic groups [e, t]. Coethnic district [d, t] and democracy [t] are as defined 
in previous tables. Coethnic group [e, t] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the president in year t belongs to ethnic 
group e. VP-coethnic group [e, t] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the vice-president in year t belongs to ethnic 
group e. VP-coethnic district [d, t] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if  ≥ 50 percent of the district’s (d ) population 
is from the ethnic group of the vice-president in year t. Kamba-Luhya-Luo District [d, 1962] is a binary indica-
tor equal to 1 if  ≥ 50 percent of the population of district (d ) is either from the ethnic group of Kambas (2 dis-
tricts), Luhyas (3), or Luos (3) according to the 1962 population census. Non-coethnic majority  < 80 percent 
[d, 1962] is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the main ethnic group in district (d ) accounts for  < 80 percent of its total 
population, excluding the presidential coethnic groups. The F-tests are for the null hypothesis that presidential/ 
vice-presidential coethnic districts (or groups) and presidential/vice-presidential non-coethnic districts (or groups) 
have equal outcomes during democracy. Columns 1–2 and 5–6 include the same set of controls as in Table 1 inter-
acted with a time trend. Columns 3 and 4 include ethnic group time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at dis-
trict (or ethnic group) level are reported in the parentheses. Data sources and construction are described in online 
Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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during democratic periods suggest that democracy partially ties the hands of both 
top executives.
It is often argued that the typical way coalition politics play out in African settings 
is in cabinet formation. Our dataset on the ethnicity of all cabinet ministers for elec-
tion years between 1963 and 2011 reveals that Kenyan cabinets have been surpris-
ingly representative, incorporating many ethnic groups beyond that of the president 
even during periods of autocracy (panel B of online Appendix Table A1). This is in 
line with what Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi (2015) find for the  post-independence 
cabinets of 15 African countries. When we regress the ethnic cabinet share divided 
by population ethnic share on an ethnic group indicator (which equals 1 if the 
group is coethnic with the serving president) we find that the president’s group 
receives 65 percent more cabinet posts (column 3 of panel A of Table 5). This 
again is in line with Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi (2015), who find that the lead-
er’s ethnic group receives a disproportionate share of cabinet posts in the coun-
tries they study. However, when we interact the group indicator with  democrac y t 
in panel B, we find no interaction effect, indicating that the propensity to favor 
coethnics with cabinet positions is not attenuated during periods of democracy. In 
column 4 we see that the ethnic groups of both the president and vice president are 
favored with cabinet positions but that once again neither of these patterns is signifi-
cantly affected by democracy.
These patterns are informative in at least two respects. First, there is indeed a 
propensity for presidents and vice presidents to “stuff” the cabinet with coethnics. 
Second, this tendency is not checked by the arrival of democracy, which suggests 
that the relationship between ethnic favoritism and democratization that we estimate 
is very unlikely to be driven by changes in cabinet composition.
Allocating cabinet positions to ethnic groups that are not coethnic with the presi-
dent may help reduce the threat of revolution from outsiders and coups from insiders 
(Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015). However, what our results indicate is that this 
representation does not translate into enhanced road investment in the districts that 
share the ethnicity of these non-coethnic ministers. It has primarily been the presi-
dent who retains the power to allocate public road resources in Kenya, and democ-
racy constrains this power without substantially changing ethnic coalition politics, 
at least as reflected in cabinet composition.
Another possibility is that presidents may target road investments to districts 
dominated by large non-coethnic groups when democracy arrives not because 
they are constrained in their actions, but because this may be an effective means of 
securing swing votes in competitive elections. In column 5 of Table 5 we see that 
the coefficient estimate on the Kamba-Luhya-Luo district indicator interacted with 
democracy is not statistically significant.25 This implies that districts dominated 
by these ethnic groups, who are likely to be pivotal in elections, do not receive 
additional road investments relative to other non-coethnic groups when the coun-
try becomes democratic. In column 6 of Table 5 we interact our democracy mea-
sure with an indicator for non-coethnic districts where one ethnic group comprises 
less than 80 percent of the population. When democracy arrives, these relatively 
25 These three large ethnic groups constituted 37 percent of the Kenyan population in 1962 and have occupied a 
similar share of the population since then (panel A of online Appendix Table A1). 
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 ethnically mixed districts (which may naturally be more competitive politically) 
do not receive more road investment than less mixed districts. In columns 5 and 6 
of online Appendix Table A8, we use the margin of victory (the winner’s minus the 
runner-up’s vote share) and a party competition Herfindahl index (both from the 
1992 election) interacted with democracy, and we once again find no evidence that 
districts where political competition was more intense receive more road investment 
when democracy returns to Kenya after 1992.
IV. Interpretation
The results indicate that our theoretical framework—where two ethnic groups 
compete to produce presidents, the president makes all public good allocation deci-
sions, and his ability to favor coethnics with public goods is limited by constraints 
on the executive—represents a useful vehicle for (i) understanding why ethnic 
favoritism might arise, and (ii) interpreting the coefficients estimated. In this sec-
tion we first use the model to derive regime-specific estimates of constraints on the 
executive ( θ ). This allows us to track changes in constraints across democratic and 
autocratic periods even for the same leader. We then use material from a wide vari-
ety of sources to identify what possible factors underlie changes in  θ , focusing on 
key institutional and political reforms that have taken place since 1992.
Recall that  θ captures the ability of the executive to discriminate across ethnic 
groups. If  θ = 1 then all ethnic groups receive a public good allocation equal to 
the average per capita allocation and ethnic favoritism is therefore impossible. If 
θ = ∞ , then the executive is unconstrained as regards the extent to which public 
good allocation to his ethnic group can exceed the average allocation. The fact that 
(1) is binding in equilibrium allows us to derive empirical estimates of  θ . Specifically, 
our estimate  β can be expressed in terms of the model as
  β =   η AA −  η BA   ____________   π A η AA +  π B η BA . 
We can thus estimate a specific  β for each regime (see Table 4) and translate it 
into regime-specific  θ s using the fact that  θ = 1 + β(1 −  π A ) for each of the five 
regimes.26 This enables us to trace the evolution of  θ across the five periods shown 
in Figure 1: Kenyatta democracy, Kenyatta autocracy, Moi autocracy, Moi democ-
racy, and Kibaki democracy. The results are presented in Figure 6. We also include 
the polity score for Kenya from Figure 2 in this figure.27
There is a remarkable correspondence between these two measures over time. 
The early democratic period in the 1960s was characterized by relative demo-
cratic freedoms, and essentially no evidence of ethnic favoritism toward Kenyatta’s 
Kikuyu ethnic group, with the estimated  θ near 1. However, there is a sharp increase 
in  θ after 1970, when democracy was abandoned, with  θ moving higher toward 
26 The transformation uses the fact that  η AA = θ ( π A η AA +  π B η BA ) and  η BA =   [ π A η AA +  π B η BA ] −  π A η AA    ____________________  π B  to 
generate the expression  β =  θ − 1 _____ π B  .  π 
A captures the population share of the ethnic group that is coethnic with the 
serving president. This value varies across periods as the president’s ethnicity changes. 
27 Note that the  θ score is presented with a reverse axis to facilitate comparison with the polity score. 
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a value of 2. Polity scores move in tandem, dropping precipitously around 1970, 
signaling a collapse in democratic freedoms, and staying low until the early 1990s. 
θ moves even higher during Moi’s single-party rule (1979–1992), reaching  2.68 , 
implying that the president’s coethnic districts received more than 2.5 times more 
road funds on average than other groups. However,  θ moves back toward 1 when 
democracy was restored in late 1992 and ends up nearly equal to 1, indicating that 
there is effectively no ethnic favoritism in the most recent period, which is the most 
democratic on record for post-independence Kenya. Polity scores also rise sharply 
in the early 1990s, signaling a return to democratic freedoms, and actually, by the 
2000s, achieve levels which exceed those seen in the 1960s. Figure 6 thus indicates 
that, during the autocratic 1970s and 1980s, presidents are less constrained in their 
ability to skew road spending toward coethnic districts relative to the democratic 
1960s, 1990s, and 2000s. The value of democracy lies in its ability to tie the hands 
of presidents so that they cannot allocate public resources in a discriminatory way.
The comovement of  θ and the polity measure of democracy in Figure 6 begs the 
question of what underlies the changes in  θ . Digging into the various components of 
the polity measure sheds some light into the institutional changes occurring in Kenya 
during its political transitions. Closer examination of Figure 6 reveals that the com-
bined polity score decreased from 0 to −7 in the transition out of democracy during 
Kenyatta’s leadership. Almost all subcomponents of the score changed at that time: 
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment worsened (there was only 
one party now, whose leader was chosen for life), constraints on the chief executive 
weakened (the president could generally bypass parliament), regulation of politi-
cal participation became restrictive (participation was restricted to life members of 
the single-party and civil society was heavily repressed), and  competitiveness of 
−10
−5
0
5
10
C
om
bined polity score
0
1
2
3
E
th
ni
c 
fa
vo
rit
is
m
,  θ
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
θ Polity IV
Figure 6. Ethnic Favoritism and Political Regimes, 1963–2011 
Notes: This figure plots  θ , our estimate of ethnic favoritism, and the revised combined polity 
score for Kenya annually from 1963 to 2011. The two vertical solid lines represent political 
transitions: December 1969 is the transition from democracy to autocracy, while December 
1992 is the return of democracy. Data sources and construction are described in online 
Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
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 participation was eliminated (there was only one candidate for the executive seat). 
It is little wonder that the president under this autocratic regime felt free to allocate 
resources largely as he wished.
The reform of the constitution and the return to democracy in 1992 led the com-
bined polity score to improve from −7 to −5 and up to −2 in 1997 as parties were 
allowed to compete and KANU’s tight grip on civil society gradually loosened (this 
process increased scores on both regulation and competitiveness of political partic-
ipation). This movement from −7 to −2 represents a very significant improvement 
in fundamental democratic freedoms. After the democratic presidential transition 
of 2002, other components of the polity score improve and push the overall score 
sharply higher, to around 8. Our estimated  θ matches this path: from post-1992 to 
2002, the estimated  θ equals  1.62 but this drops to  1.00 after 2002.  1.62 represents 
a significant increase in constraints on the executive relative to the Moi autocratic 
years ( θ = 2.68 ) but falls short of the more fully constrained post-2002 setting 
( θ = 1.00 ) where ethnic favoritism in road investment has largely disappeared.
We now turn to examining different factors that might underlie these changes in 
θ. Information on where roads were being built in the press certainly seems to have 
increased after the arrival of democracy in 1992. In online Appendix Figure A4 we 
have catalogued the number of stories pertaining to roads during the 1985–2010 
period for the two daily independent newspapers with the largest national circu-
lation, the The Daily Nation and The Standard. Using a team of two Kenyan jour-
nalists (who were not informed of our research question) we counted the number 
of stories relating to roads in each of the daily editions of these two newspapers in 
1985–2010. In online Appendix Figure A4 we see that the number of stories refer-
ring to roads in The Daily Nation jumps abruptly about a year after the arrival of 
democracy, in December 1992. The same pattern is seen for The Standard though 
the rise occurs slightly earlier, in 1991. The increases in road reporting are not small; 
pre-1992 the number of road stories in the The Daily Nation is around 25 per annum 
rising to about twice that after 1992. The rise in road reporting in The Standard is 
more moderate, with comparable numbers being 35 and 54. The fact that the pattern 
is the same for two separate newspapers is reassuring and indicates that newspapers 
are conveying more information about road investments after democracy.28 Working 
out how this information is being utilized is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
the fact that it is more available is an important change. These developments line 
up with country-level measures which try to capture the freedom of civil society 
institutions. A plot of the Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index, for example, 
reveals that press freedom moved from “not free” to “partly free” when the switch 
to multiparty politics occurred (not shown).
Broadcast media (TV and radio) on the other hand remained more firmly in 
the government’s grip. The two TV stations Kenya Broadcasting Company and 
Kenya Television Network initially continued to be subject to state oversight in the 
post-democratic period.29 The situation was similar for radio, a major source of 
information for the rural majority, which saw no independent radio licenses granted 
28 Roads as a share of total development expenditure is similar on either side of 1992 indicating that the large 
rises we observe are not just a function of increases in road investment after democracy arrives. 
29 All 20 applications to start new TV stations during the period 1985–1995 were rejected. 
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until 1996. The situation, however, improved dramatically after 1998 when state 
censorship of broadcast media was abolished, and by 2000 Kenya had 9 private TV 
stations and 19 radio stations. While state harassment has not totally disappeared, it 
is undeniable that mass media has become much freer since the early 1990s.
The number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also grew rapidly in the 
1990s. While Kenyan law does not allow international donors to fund opposition 
political parties, they did fund governance-focused civil society organizations. Aid 
was also increasingly channeled through NGOs and by the late 1990s, Kenya had 
among the highest concentration of NGOs per capita in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
churches, often in tandem with NGOs, also played a crucial role in the 1990s in giv-
ing voice to the need for impartial conduct of elections and voter registration reforms.
A freer press and a stronger civil society, together with Western donor pressure, 
eventually made Moi realize that he had to accommodate demands for further open-
ness. This brought about three key reforms in 1997: the so-called Inter-Parliamentary 
Parties Group (IPPG) reforms. The IPPG reforms reduced state internal security 
powers (e.g., preventive detention) and amended the Public Order, Broadcasting, 
and Societies Acts.30 The final years of the Moi regime also saw a rise in the power 
of parliament, with constitutional amendments that increased its independence from 
the executive branch.
Institutional reforms which place greater scrutiny on the actions of the president 
have continued. A new constitution was ratified by voters in 2010 that altered the 
division of powers between the central government and newly created (and popu-
larly elected) county governments, and consolidated a more independent judiciary. 
Nowadays, Kenya’s increasingly well-informed, educated, and connected popula-
tion is highly politically engaged. Parliamentary debates are frequently shown on 
national TV and discussion forums are held to allow for civil society feedback. 
Misguided public investments and corruption remain widespread but are more reg-
ularly brought to light by the press (Wrong 2009).
It is hardly surprising that ethnic favoritism in public resource allocation is now 
much more difficult to carry out than in the past. Ethnic divisions have not disap-
peared, and they remain highly politically salient, as tragically demonstrated in the 
post-election violence in 2007–2008. However, freer flows of information, a vocal 
civil society and an independent parliament all severely curtail the ability of the 
executive to blatantly discriminate between different districts in choosing where to 
place roads projects. This is succinctly captured in our estimated  θ = 1.00 for the 
post-2002 period.
V. Conclusion
For ethnic favoritism to be a viable political strategy, the president must be able to 
manipulate the allocation of public expenditure with few constraints and little polit-
ical cost. Ethnic favoritism and weak controls on the chief executive thus go hand in 
30 The Public Order Act was amended to remove the need to obtain a license before meetings, replacing it with 
a need to notify the police. The Broadcasting Act was changed to provide free air-time to all parties and to promote 
a balanced show of opinions. The Societies Act was amended to require the registrar to respond reasonably to all 
requests for voter registration within 120 days. 
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hand. As democracy becomes consolidated in many low-income countries, includ-
ing many in sub-Saharan Africa, not only does political competition become better 
regulated, but the constraints on executive action are also strengthened due to the 
scrutiny that parliament, mass media, and civil society are able to exercise. In this 
paper we examine this logic in detail by asking two empirical questions. First, can 
we detect quantitative evidence of ethnic favoritism in public resource  allocation in 
an African country? Second, does the transition into and out of democracy under the 
same leader exacerbate or constrain this ethnic favoritism?
Though many of Africa’s ills have been blamed on ethnic favoritism, it has been 
surprisingly difficult to find concrete evidence of this behavior, mostly due to lack 
of data. Therefore, to address these questions we construct two new data series that 
directly capture public allocation decisions by the central government, one based 
on the geographic coding of road project data and the other on the innovative use 
of historical maps. We are helped in this respect by the fact that each Kenyan dis-
trict is dominated by a particular ethnic group, which allows us to precisely assign 
expenditures or road length to ethnic groups. In answering the second question, 
we are helped by the fact that there have been multiple switches of power between 
leaders of different ethnic groups in Kenya and, within each ethnic regime, switches 
between democracy and autocracy.
There are two main empirical results. First, central government investments in 
roads have been subject to a high degree of ethnic favoritism, with districts coethnic 
to the president receiving three times the average expenditure in roads and five times 
the length of paved roads during periods of autocracy. In contrast, ethnic groups 
not linked to the president, which constitute the bulk of the population, receive far 
fewer roads across the 23-year autocratic period. Second, these biases disappear 
almost entirely during periods of democracy. This more equal treatment, however, 
is not enough to overturn the roads deficit that non-coethnic groups accumulated 
over autocracy.
Our result on the presence of ethnic favoritism is broadly in line with an innova-
tive set of recent papers that use recall data on fertility and the health and schooling 
outcomes of children in Demographic and Health Surveys to construct panel data on 
infant mortality and years of schooling that span different presidential regimes. These 
outcome measures, which reflect the combined human capital investment decisions 
made by households, communities, and governments, are useful complements to our 
direct measure of central government road investment. Kramon and Posner (2014) 
show that Kenyan citizens who are coethnic with the president, education minister, 
and the health minister are more likely to attend and complete primary and second-
ary school. Frank and Rainer (2012) use household data for 18 African countries to 
show that being coethnic with the political leader leads to lower infant mortality and 
a higher probability of completing primary school.31
Our result that democracy mitigates ethnic favoritism also requires wider investi-
gation given that autocracy has been rapidly declining both in Africa and around the 
world (see Figure 2 and online Appendix Figure A5). Hodler and Raschky (2014) 
move the literature in this direction, using subnational data from across the world 
31 Individual regressions for their 18 countries reveal positive, significant effects for these outcomes in wide 
range of countries suggesting that ethnic favoritism is widespread in Africa. 
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for 1992–2009 to show that the region of birth of the national political leader shows 
greater night light density shortly after he takes office. This effect is muted during 
periods of democracy. Indeed, when a country’s polity score exceeds 6, birth regions 
of the political leader are no longer favored, which is in line with our findings for 
Kenya. The global scope of that paper, plus the fact that light intensity captures the 
influence of a range of public goods as well as economic development per se, make 
it an interesting complement to our paper.
Linking our findings to aggregate economic outcomes represents a key priority 
for future research.32 Figure 7 and Table 6 represent a first attempt in this direc-
tion. In Figure 7 we see that economic growth in Kenya and in Africa as a whole 
are highest during the democratic periods (the 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s) and falls 
toward zero during autocratic periods (1970s and 1980s). It is striking in Figure 7 
that growth collapses precisely when Kenya becomes autocratic (in 1969) and then 
rises again when democracy returns (in 1992). Comparing Figure 2 with Figure 7, a 
similar picture emerges for Africa as a whole. Of course, many factors beyond eth-
nic favoritism might lie behind these patterns. Yet if we take the oft-cited negative 
relationship between ethnic favoritism and economic performance seriously, then 
the reduction of ethnic favoritism during periods of democracy could have contrib-
uted to higher economic growth during these periods.33
32 Acemoglu et al. (2014) exploit the fact that transitioning to democracy or autocracy is highly correlated 
across countries in the same region (see Figure 2) to provide evidence that democracy has a significant positive 
effect on growth. 
33 A recent literature emphasizes how investments in transportation infrastructure can increase productivity and 
growth (see Michaels 2008; Donaldson forthcoming; Jedwab and Moradi forthcoming). Our results suggest that 
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Figure 7. Evolution of GDP Per Capita Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1963–2011 
Notes: This figure plots real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth (percent) for 
Kenya and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (population weighted average). We illustrate a five-
year moving average to reduce the year-to-year volatility in growth. The vertical lines repre-
sent regime changes in Kenya: December 1969 is the transition from democracy to autocracy, 
while December 1992 is the return of democracy. Data sources and construction are described 
in online Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
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In Table 6 we probe this idea further by extending the influential Easterly 
and Levine (1997) analysis. In column 1, we replicate their key result using 
 cross-country data for the whole world from the 1960s to the 1980s, which shows 
ethnic  fractionalization is negatively associated with economic growth. Column 2 
extends the Easterly-Levine dataset to the 2000s. The ethnic diversity-growth rela-
tionship is now smaller in magnitude and no longer statistically significant. This 
is interesting because the 1990s and 2000s were the period when many countries 
across the world became democratic (see online Appendix Figure A5). In column 3 
we test whether the association between ethnic fractionalization and economic 
growth varies with the presence of democracy. The results are striking: while the 
negative relationship Easterly and Levine (1997) uncovered still holds for autocra-
cies, there is no association between ethnic fractionalization and economic growth 
in democracies. Column 4 shows that if we restrict the sample to Africa, the negative 
these resources were misallocated during autocracy, which may help explain why economic growth was depressed 
during the 1970s and 1980s in Kenya. 
Table 6—Economic Growth, Ethnic Diversity, and Democratic Changes across Countries, 1960–2010
Dependent variable Growth of per capita real GDP [c, t]
Sample World World World Africa
Decades 1960s–1980s 1960s–2000s 1960s–2000s 1960s–2000s
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic [c, 1960] −0.017*** −0.006 −0.015* −0.023**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011)
Ethnic [c, 1960] × democracy [c, t] 0.013 0.036**
(0.009) (0.015)
Democracy [c, t] −0.002 −0.018
(0.005) (0.012)
F-test [ p-value] 0.10 1.12
 H 0 : Ethnic + (ethnic × democracy) = 0 [0.76] [0.30]
Observations 312 528 500 182
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS regressions on country-decadal panel dataset of 110 countries (c) for the last five decades (t): 1960s, 
1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Growth of per capita real GDP [c, t] is the average growth rate of real per capita 
GDP for country c in decade t. We use Easterly and Levine’s (1997)—henceforth, EL97—dataset for the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, and extend the data for two additional decades using Penn World Tables v7.1. Ethnic [c, 1960] 
is the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization of country c in 1960 (EL97). Democracy [c, t] is a binary indicator 
equal to 1 if country c is not an autocracy in decade t, with autocracy being defined as the average combined pol-
ity score for decade t if the threshold defined by Polity IV is  < −5. EL97 uses seemingly unrelated regressions; we 
run OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at the country level, results are robust to the different method. 
Columns 1–3 include identical controls as in column 1 of Table IV in EL97 (“Indicator for the 1960s,” “Indicator 
for the 1970s,” “Indicator for the 1980s,” “Indicator Variable for Sub-Saharan Africa,” “Indicator Variable for Latin 
America and the Caribbean,” “Log of Initial Income,” “(Log of Initial Income) Squared,” with the exception of 
“Log of Schooling,” due to a large number of missing observations for Africa (see Barro and Lee 2010)). In col-
umn 4, we restrict the sample to only the African countries (38) and run the same specification as in column 3, 
excluding region fixed effects. The F-test is for the hypothesis that more or less ethnically diverse countries have 
equal outcomes under democracy. Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in the parentheses. 
Data sources and construction are described in online Appendix A and Table A2 of online Appendix E.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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ethnic diversity-growth relationship still holds in autocracies but again is eliminated 
in democracies, thus paralleling our findings for Kenya.
Obviously, these cross-country results cannot necessarily be taken as causal, since 
democratization may be correlated with other important societal changes and is far 
from randomly assigned. Nonetheless, we view these patterns as useful for motivat-
ing further research. Particularly high on this research agenda is gaining a better the-
oretical and empirical understanding of how democracy fosters institutional changes 
which constrain public resource misallocation and underpin economic growth. This 
is as relevant for Kenya as it is for Myanmar and for the broad range of countries that 
are moving from autocracy into some form of imperfect democracy.
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